The Yemeni Art of Capturing a Killer

The security situation in Yemen is deteriorating from bad to worst.While people still have the illusion of safety, it is very obvious that the rule of law in Yemen is almost non-existant. More than ever, Yemenis are clinging to social bonds and tribal affiliations as means of protection. Security check points are dispersed all over the capital Sana'a, however; the past month has been eventful. For example, in the past week alone, Baghdad Street was blocked due to a conflict between a Sheikh (tribesman) and the police (the policeman was killed), another Sheikh took control of the Faj 'Attan area due to a land dispute (which is still ongoing), an engineer was killed in the Ministry of Justice by an unknown motorcyclist, a group of armed men invaded Souk Shumailah to loot the place, and an Omani diplomat was kidnapped for 12 hours, all in what used to be the safest city in Yemen.

The poster featuring Al-khateeb (left) and Aman (right) reads: "Caution. There is an Armed Sheikh in the Car. Instructions necessitate you do not overtake the car"

On May 15, 2013, one of the most heinous crimes took place in Sana'a. Two young men Al-Khateeb and Aman, both under the age of 21,were killed in cold blood when they intercepted a tribal wedding motorcade. To this day, no arrests have been made even though the tribe responsible for this crime is identified (to read more on this, click here). Just last week, Aman was buried in Sana'a and the week before, Al-Khateeb was buried in Aden.

When it comes to killings in Yemen, two main factors determine whether justice will be served:
1) Whether the assailant is from a powerful tribe.
2) Whether the deceased is from a powerful tribe.

Unfortunately, in the case of Al-Khateeb and Aman, they were from civilian families and the killer was associated with a powerful tribe. The ultimate let down is that the current government failed to exact justice and stood powerless infront of the force of the tribe. In other murder cases, if the killer is not from a powerful tribe and the deceased from a powerful one, then it is almost certain that justice - if not vengeance - will be served.

At times, the killer and the deceased belong equally powerful tribes. In these situations, families/tribes have to exact their own justice.

Just three days ago, Ahmed from Al-Haimah was killed at Jawlat Al Sayah in Sana'a around 2pm. The killer escaped and the government captured the deceased's acquaintances. They are "suspects" until the actual killer is captured. The killer fled the scene but he left his car behind. Ahmed's cousin speaks with certainty that the police have the killer's identity based on the fact that they have the car's registration numbers. He claims that the investigator on duty is keeping the killer's identity secret because he is from a decent sized tribe from Bani Matar. He said: "the police aren't serious about their search. They are conveniently keeping Ahmed's friends in prison and are scared to confront the killer's tribe. The government is no longer eminent". Using his own connections, a man from a separate investigative unit confirmed that the police have the killer's phone number. Ahmed's family has the killer's home phone but the killer is in hiding. His tribe refuses to be discouraged and vows that Ahmed's blood won't go to waste.

Over the years, Ahmed's tribe managed to compile an impressive collection of weapons. During Saleh's era, they received their share of weapons but the collection grew bigger during the revolution of 2011. During this time, the tribe retained all smuggled weapons captured on their lands. Today, they have a Kord 12.7, a 14.5 Vladimirov KPV, and RPGs. Furthermore, they control about 35 miles of the Sana'a - Hodaidah travel road. Using their sovereignty, they blocked the travel road for an hour. They stopped aside all cars with army, police and government tags. These cars with the men inside them are now their prisoners. According to tribal tradition, they will feed and care for them. Ahmed's cousin is certain that this tactic will put enough pressure on the government to bring forth the killer. If not, they will just have to create more pressure. Surrendering is not an option. One thing is for sure: they will find the killer.

RPG Image from Here

Kord 12.7 (Image from Wikipedia)

14.5 Vladimirov KPV from Here

Yemen's National Dialogue Behind Closed Doors

This post was originally posted at MENA source by the Atlantic Council

Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference (NDC), which began on March 18 and just reached the halfway point of its six-month mandate, was conceived as a core part of the transition process and is intended to bring together Yemen’s diverse political, social, geographic, and demographic groups to address the most critical issues plaguing the beleaguered country. Unfortunately, the way the dialogue was developed, designed, and directed created intrinsic flaws that may undercut its success. Some argue that the large number of participants and the lack of genuine representation outside of political parties are the reasons it is doomed for failure. Others feel that the process is advancing too quickly, leaving honest reconciliation out of the equation. One of the other major concerns is the lack of clear communication with the Yemeni public, transparency of the proceedings, and oversight of expenditures. 

Although some Yemen experts remain pessimistic about the future of the country, they refrain from critiquing the dialogue because the outcome is still unclear and many perceive the dialogue as the only way to prevent a descent into civil war. Particularly because the process is opaque and because there is genuine skepticism about the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) transition agreement and the dialogue itself, the NDC should pro-actively report on all working group and plenary proceedings, publish all records and modifications, and disclose all financial contributions and allocations. This is the time to measure the discrepancy between the dialogue’s stated intention and the reality on the ground, if there is hope for effective progress.

The Technical Committee of the National Dialogue clearly stated in a December 2012 statement that the NDC will have its own radio and television channel; however, this promise was never fulfilled. Instead, the NDC opted for the use of modern social media sites like Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, catering exclusively to the international community and the less than 15 percent of Yemenis who use the internet. Since March 18, not a single Facebook NDC post received more than nine comments.

Although the Dialogue’s Secretariat has tried to provide some information on its website, there is a tendency to understate or leave out important details that relinquishes crucial information to the interpretations of partisan media outlets. While some facets of the dialogue are downplayed, others are entirely omitted. For instance, the final reports of the nine working committees remain unofficial; some reports have surfaced, but only because they have been leaked. Also, there is no updated official list of participants available on the website or elsewhere since approximately thirty members of the NDC withdrew and/or were replaced. Likewise, there is no official record of all organizations and agencies “supporting” the NDC, like the United Nations (UN), World Bank, and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The lack of disclosure raises many important questions regarding the nature and amount of support that international organizations are providing. For example, the high-end Movenpick Hotel is the official NDC venue and it is reportedly packed with foreign governance experts and consultants who are being handsomely compensated, but little is known regarding the affiliation of these experts, what technical assistance they are offering Yemenis, or whether their role is beneficial and effective. With no answers in plain sight, it is easy to accuse the NDC of the selective concealment of facts.

This shortage of information and lack of community is still at times blamed on budget constraints even though the NDC’s official website reports that a total of 138 computers, thirty-five laptops and 225 cell phones were purchased. The initial budget for the NDC was an estimated $35 million dollars and according to more recent reports, $29 million has already been utilized. It is public knowledge that members of the NDC residing in Sana’a are compensated $100 per day and those residing outside of Sana’a are compensated a $180 per day. Millions are being spent on honoraria for members of the dialogue, compensation for foreign expertise, and the administrative expenses of the day-to-day operations; yet there is no easily accessible source of information regarding these expenses and the overall budget for the dialogue. This transparency is important not only for the NDC, but also because such practices would set a positive precedent as a possible blueprint for how the next Yemeni government will budget, spend, and monitor its public funds. Without budget transparency, the average Yemeni has little reason to trust the dialogue, the transitional process, or any future government.  

Just like the dialogue, transparency is a process, and in the NDC’s case, it is one that needs constant cultivation. The main facilitator of the GCC initiative and UN’s special envoy to Yemen, Jamal Ben Omar, asserts that the NDC is the most successful transitional process in the Arab World and the only transparent process that will provide real outcomes. Yet, in several interviews, he had to dismiss rumors claiming that the outcome has been predetermined or that the solutions will be determined by the old ruling elites outside the NDC process. These assertions gain steam among the public because of the obscurity surrounding the NDC; the only way to ensure a successful transitional process is to engage the Yemeni people – openly, actively, and with a genuine spirit of inclusivity. Transparency does not guarantee the success of the dialogue, but it is a fundamental requirement to gain the trust of the Yemeni people.

It Wasn't Me: Yemen's Conspiracy Theories (1/2)

Part 1 of 2

As Arabs, we love conspiracy theories. Everything is far more exciting if there is a mysterious plot to unravel. Not to mention, it's easier to abandon all responsibilities if it there a “scheme” in place and a "mastermind" behind it. In Yemen's conspiracy theories, we are the victims, the injured party, the biggest loser, and the subject of all interest. Despite being inherently realists, we exhibit bursts of borderline personality and a hint of narcissistic tendencies. When it comes to conspiracy narratives, some are outright outrageous, others are meticulously constructed (and over time become self-fulling prophecies), and only a handful are fathomable explanations.

This blog post lists some of the “conspiracy theories” circulating in Yemen. It has no interest in debunking them nor in unraveling the truth that lies behind them.

• About a year ago, right after the NASA Rover landed on Mars, Yemeni media outlets published one of the most dangerous theories yet. Our (Yemeni) high-tech investigative techniques revealed that NASA was hiding a big secret from us. We were told that NASA had physical proof, for years, that Lailat al Qadar exists and they shamelessly hid it from us. Apparently NASA, a US agency responsible for aerospace research invested a load of their time and money to trackback this day with technology as advanced as the space Rovers. The biggest shock was that the article assumed that Yemenis needed NASA to prove it...   

Lailat al Qadr, literally translates to Night of Destiny, and is the night that the first verses of the Quran were revealed to the prophet Muhammed when he encountered the angel Jibreel (Gabriel). Traditionally, it is believed to be on one of the last nights of Ramadan and there is no specific date for it.

• Israel, one of the most notorious countries in the Middle East, is always the subject of several conspiracy theories. Overtime, it became very convenient to blame anything on them. Once the Arab Spring started, former President Saleh gave a statement that attributed the Arab Spring to a vague Israeli/American blueprint to destroy the Middle East. While many Yemenis are innately susceptible to these kind of theories, unfortunately for Saleh, it was just too little too late!  
• Accompanying Saleh’s long shot, an article surfaced that Israel finally devised a weapon more catastrophic than any nuclear bomb. They finally succeeded in creating a special gas that can be inserted into a bomb. The secret is once the bomb is dropped in any part of the world, the gas only kills Muslims. (not to mention the Israeli belts distributed all over Yemen to make our men infertile)

• Speaking about gas, fellow tweeter Ibrahim Muthana once wrote that a taxi driver tried to explain his lethargy. The taxi driver revealed that the US has been actively spraying Yemenis with a secret gas to keep us tired and unproductive... (Qat and malnutrition didn't come to mind..)

• While Yemen witnessed (and continues to witness) several campaigns against women, one of the most important issues that Yemenis continue to worry about is the term “gender”.  Most Yemenis (men and women) continue to misuse the term and substitute it for “equality”. Regardless of this lack of understanding, a university dropout warned us about the dangers of “gender”. If “gender” succeeds in being a component of the National Dialogue, then it will only legalize homosexuality and adultery. At first, it is easy to dismiss such ramblings; but after serious pondering, you begin to see the light. Why? Of course! Enhancing Women’s access to education is about enlightenment... and enlightenment makes us think of the Italian Renaissance... and the renaissance is about rebirth...rebirth coincided with secularism...Therefore, if women are educated then it must mean that Yemenis will abandon their faith . Just think about it! all these literate women... reading about adultery...how gay!

• Just when you think that most conspiracy theories are generated by fundamentalists, I have to end this streak with another Arab Spring Theory. It is not a secret that the protests in Tunisia inspired the rest of the Middle East nor is it a secret that for at least a decade most Arabs living under repressive/authoritarian regimes preferred Islamist parties over other political parties for their political organization and service delivery. When the structured Islamist parties began winning votes across the Arab world, and most notably when the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) won the elections in Egypt, it became apparent to liberals everywhere that the Arab Spring is an Islamist ploy to secure power. The truth is; Islamists got bored of waiting for their turn to rule. For months, even years, men from all over the Arab World gathered (perhaps in London?) to plan a revolt that would lead to the world domination. The protests in Turkey may appear contradictory to this theory, but rest assured, it is part of a bigger plan...

• Yemen witnesses blackouts on a daily basis. Once in a blue moon, the electricity stays on. Rather than enjoying the 260 year old technology, we worry about the consequences of this abrupt reward. While electricity blackouts are not a laughing matter, many Yemenis feel better blaming such misfortune on 'Afash. Yes, it is all the fault of Ali Abdullah Saleh. Even the tribes and AQAP agree. It's all him. He always left Yemenis in the dark, literally.

• The radical branch of the Southern secessionists in Yemen blamed the downfall of YSP on a few Northern individuals in 1986. While these radical thinkers refuse to join the National Dialogue, the Northerners are worried about something far worse: Payback. 

President Hadi is from Abyan (South of Yemen) and the Majority of his government and Military appointments were for fellow Southerners. Unfortunately, a southern majority government didn't contain Hirak but it sure worried Northerners. They believe that - and Journalist Adam Baron describes it - president Hadi is a "closet separatist". Yemen is in a mess right now and just when everything gets worse (hard to imagine), president Hadi and his government will smoothly transition to rule the South. The Southerners would enjoy heaven (Aden) and the Northerners will be abandoned without any leadership or resources.

End of Part 1, more in Part 2

Fazli Çorman on Education Reform in Yemen (Part II)

Over the past few years, it became very apparent that the Turkish government is strategically strengthening its ties in Yemen through educational projects and programs. Yemen now has three Turkish schools, one in the capital Sana’a and two in the cities of Aden and Taiz. Furthermore, since 2013, the Turkish embassy announced that 22 scholarships will be given to 22 students, each from a different governorate in Yemen. This is one of many costly educational projects that Turkey has taken on board. Mr. Çorman states that the Turkish involvement with the Yemeni educational system is not something new and goes further by suggesting that the “new model” of the Yemeni educational system will be influenced by Turkey:

“There is a huge demand in Yemen for students to study in Turkey. Therefore, we organized an “Education Fair” from the 3-4 March in Sana'a and the 5-6 March in Aden. The new 22 extra scholarships for the best student of each governorate that you mentioned in your question were announced as a support to Yemen by the Rector of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan University located in Rize, during this Education Fair.
We’re regularly providing more scholarships every year for Yemeni students to study in Turkey. For instance last year, there was record number of 1,700 Yemeni applicants to the Turkish scholarship. A delegation came from Turkey and they conducted more than 200 interviews with the best candidates. Fifty of them were selected and now they are studying in Turkey.

Yemeni Ministers, like Minister of High Education H.E. Hisham Sharaf Abdullah, Minister of Education H.E. Abdurrezzak Yahya Al-Ashwal and Minister of Technical and Vocational Training H.E. Dr. Abdulhafiz Numan are very cooperative with in developing the educational system in Yemen together. Hereby, I would like to thank them for showing this cooperation and for participating in the opening ceremony of the Education Fair. On a separate note, we furnished the Yemeni-Turkish Technical and Vocational Training Institute in Sanaa for 2.6 million Dollars. We are searching possibilities to open a Yemeni-Turkish University”.

- You can follow the Turkish Ambassador @FazliCorman

A Conversation with the Turkish Ambassador to Yemen (Part I)

Çorman says that no foreign power should interfere in Yemen’s internal affairs. (YT archive photo by Amira Nasser)

Originally published in Yemen Times 

The Turkish Ambassador to Yemen, Fazli Çorman, previously served in Greece, Oman, Japan and Canada. Upon his assignment to Yemen, he quickly made a name for himself in the country as he is one of only two ambassadors with a Twitter account. He now has more than 2,000 followers and prides himself on being accessible. 

In an interview, Çorman talks about the complex relationship Yemen and Turkey have. Those who remember the Ottomans fondly view the empire as a force that structured the North of Yemen. Today, Yemenis in this category continue to celebrate their “Turkish heritage.” While others, who remember the Ottomans as occupiers, believe Turkey is primarily expanding its influence in the Middle East through Yemen. On this relationship, Çorman said: 

"We all know that Turkey and Yemen have had a strong relationship, for centuries. There are deep cultural affinities, ties of brotherhood, as well as a firm solidarity between the Turkish and Yemeni people. Almost all Yemenis know this fact and feel very close to Turkey. The Yemeni-Turkish brotherhood is deeply-rooted; transcending any particular period or personal realm. Thus, efforts to harm this brotherhood are doomed to be unsuccessful.  Yemen is special to us, and we have nothing but good intentions. We deem Yemen’s security and stability as of our own. Our Yemeni brothers and sisters can be sure that nothing will affect the excellent relationship between the two brotherly countries. It will only reinforce our ties. I have bad news for those who are disturbed by the developing Turkish-Yemeni brotherhood. Our relationship will only grow faster."

The Turkish government has become one of Yemen’s main trading partners. Just two months ago, Turkey received its first shipment of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from Yemen.  When asked about Turkey’s future economic cooperation plans with Yemen and what to expect, Çorman said Yemen's struggling economy has a lot of potential. 

"Turkey’s Ege Gaz LNG company received the cargo at Aliağa Port on March 9. This shipment supports the Yemeni economy and other shipments will follow. We all know that Yemeni gas is sold at very low prices and Turkey is ready to purchase Yemeni gas at the world market price. I think this trade will not only increase Yemeni exports to Turkey and thereby balance the bilateral trade, but will also give leverage to the Yemeni government in their negotiations with Yemeni gas prices.

Also, I have observed an increase of all kinds of Turkish goods in the market. This shows development in the bilateral trade relations, which are reflected by our statistics. Our trade volume in 2012 was a new record in our economic relations. It was approximately $500 million in 2012 which, not only doubled the figures of 2011, but exceeded all statistics prior to 2011. Our target is to contribute by further increasing this volume to at least $1 billion in the near future,” Corman said.

Turkey's ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), is considered by many as one of the most conservative parties with Islamist roots to have power since the time of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Rumors are circulating that suggest Turkey is dealing primarily with individuals in Yemen from the Islah Party, which is the largest opposition party in Yemen  also with Islamic-roots. Examples people put forward are that of an Islahi tribal Sheikh Hameed Al-Ahmar, who is also accused of being part of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s former regime and said to have multimillion dollar businesses in Turkey. Tawakkol Karman, the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, also an Islahi, was awarded Turkish citizenship. Furthermore Corman was asked to comment on Islahis who were wounded during the Yemeni Revolution and were sent to Turkey for treatment. 

“First of all, any Yemeni businessmen can have a business in Turkey. Hameed Al-Ahmar may be one of them. We invite and welcome all Yemeni businessmen to invest or establish businesses in Turkey regardless of their political affiliation. Secondly, Tawakkol Karman was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize before she gained Turkish citizenship. In this regard, she successfully represented Muslim women in general and Arab women in particular. It is with this understanding that Turkish citizenship was given to her and her family, as a result of our appreciation of her strong voice as a Muslim woman which has been heard in the West for the first time. Our act is out of respect and should not be traced with any other intention behind it.  

“Thirdly, in the framework of the Agreement Concerning the Cooperation in the Area of Health between Turkey and Yemen every year, 25 Yemeni patients—this number is increased to 100 in 2013 —who cannot be cured in Yemen can be treated in Turkey by the selection of the Yemeni Ministry of Health. If the Yemeni Ministry chooses them according to party affiliation, I do not know, and I cannot judge this. Due to the dire conditions of those injured in Yemen during the revolution and as a response to the requests of the Yemeni government, 100 more patients were offered complimentary health care. All of these patients were selected in coordination with Ministry of Health officials. Turkey is equally distanced to all parties in Yemen and doesn't think about discrimination, especially the humanitarian field.  If Yemeni people follow our news closely, then they will easily understand that these rumors and allegations are clearly baseless." 

Yemen and other countries have seized weapon shipments that passed through Turkey or originated from there in the past few years. Some of the weapons seized are said to be manufactured in Turkey and many media outlets and politicians have accused Turkey of turning a blind eye.  Corman answers who is shipping them and how the weapons are being smuggled into Yemen.  

“There have been three shipments that are associated with containers coming from Turkey over the last two years. One was caught in Dubai in March of 2011, another in Aden in November of 2012 and the last one came to Aden in November but wasn't inspected until January of 2013. All three shipments had pistols that were concealed amongst other goods. They were not declared to customs as such, and therefore they were cases of illegal smuggling. 

The pistols captured in Dubai, were blank or traumatic-firing pistols that may be modified for live ammunition, and were marked by its Turkish producer’s brand name. That producer was prosecuted and imprisoned. His license for blank-firing pistols was cancelled. The pistols captured in November 2012, were marked with a fake brand. They were small-caliber handguns and were concealed in some biscuit boxes loaded at the very back of the container. Most of them were bundled with biscuits and cakes. We got one sample of that handgun and the laboratory analysis in Turkey recently revealed that their barrel is not ribbed and they cannot fire regular live ammunition. It appears that the receiver in Yemen was planning to modify their barrel to fire live ammunition in order to make extra profit.  

The last shipment, captured in November but opened in January, contained a very small caliber of blank-firing handguns.  I am not an expert, but I personally saw these handguns and they were clearly not-capable of firing live ammunitions since they do not have the proper barrel. 

There are exaggerations involved. These cases are very amateurish and do not reflect the work of a professional arms smuggler. This does not change the fact that whomever did this broke the law by hiding weapons—blank or not—in containers declared as something else,” Corman said. “The Turkish Minister of Customs is planning to visit Yemen soon as we are searching for an agreement with Yemeni officials to prevent such cases from happening in the future.”

Soon, Yemenis won’t require a visa to travel to Turkey. Turkey would be one of the few countries around the world that won’t require visa applications from Yemeni nationals. Furthermore, some Yemenis have said Turkey is recruiting fighters from Yemen to fight in Syria against current President Bashar Assad.

"This is the most ridiculous thing that I heard. It is almost a laughing matter if the subject and aim of the allegation was not so serious. These allegations are like free-flying balloons released by obscure sources online and then whomever catches the bait, some knowingly and others inadvertently, spreads the news. Yemen has an incredibly fertile ground for every kind of conspiracy and thus, conspiracy theories abound. The lack of trust and transparency by inept and corrupt personalities allows modifiers of public opinion to play freely with these kinds of conspiracies, all in order to promote their own wicked agendas. In the case of this “balloon,” the quality of work is so low that it gives itself up. 

If Turkey would like to recruit Yemeni fighters for Syria, why would we sign an agreement to abolish visas? It's a public move that would attract the world’s attention. Also, why is the Yemeni government with its General People's Congress Foreign Minister accepting such an agreement? Wouldn’t it be simpler and wiser to just let the ‘recruited fighters’ enter into Turkey if that is what we wanted? Furthermore, this visa abolishing agreement was originally signed in January of 2011, under the presence of former President Saleh and the current President of Turkey in Sana'a. At that point, there was no revolution, neither in Yemen nor in Syria. The ratification of the agreement took longer than anticipated due to turmoil in Yemen and it was re-signed in October of 2012. 

I would like to kindly remind our Yemeni sisters and brothers that by implementing this agreement, Turkey will be one of the very few countries that opens its borders to Yemenis for free travel, and vice versa, all while the rest of the world puts more restrictions on Yemenis. We expect that it be appreciated. Those few who may still believe that Turkey recruits fighters are free of course, to ignore the agreement and to not travel to Turkey to save themselves from the risks of being lured into fighting in Syria.”

 When asked to comment on Iran’s involvement in Yemen, Ambassador Çorman had the following to say: 

“When it comes to your question about Iran or any country’s influence in Yemen, I want to believe that no partner of Yemen interferes in the internal affairs of the country. It is only the business of Yemenis to choose their partnerships as they see fit. It is true Yemen is facing many challenges, some internal and some external and we are ready to extend all necessary contributions for the consolidation of peace and stability in Yemen, as well as the well-being of the Yemeni people. Despite difficulties, I am confident to say that we are doing our best to help.”

On Drones: Yemeni Americans, Yemenis and Americans

This Monday, Aljazeera Stream held a conversation with journalist Jeremy Scahill to discuss his latest book, "Dirty Wars: the World is a Battlefield". The book is over 615 pages and "focuses on America's expanding covert wars and the White House claiming the legal authority to kill U.S. citizens". Anwar Al-Awlaki, an American/Yemeni clerk, was killed in a drone strike in Yemen and is a central figure in Scahill's book. He is the third American killed in Yemen by a drone, the other two are: Samir Khan and Abdulrahman Al-Awlaki, Anwar's 16 year old son.

After our conversation, it became apparent that the US has no intention of "capturing enemies" because they wouldn't know what to do with them. It is now a war of drones. Evan Cinq-Mars, a fellow speaker on the Stream, asked how this war will end. This is the question that everyone needs to be asking, because the use of drones is only helping AQAP recruit sympathizers which will lead to the use of more drones, and so on...

                                 

From left to right: Al-Awlaki's cousin, Activist Bushra Al Maqtari, and Rabyaah

There are obvious consequences to this policy (death, terror, etc) but, there is unrecognizable damage that could lead to sustained nonphysical conflict. There is a clash of cultures and Yemeni Americans are in the midst of it. They are rejected by association; in the US for being Arabs and maybe "terrorists" and in Yemen for being Western and for supporting "terrorists". The struggle within them is a reflection of the increasing tensions between the two countries.

The US and increasing tensions:

Due to the current economic recession, the US is only able to focus on anti-terrorism/security efforts in Yemen. The diplomats at the American Embassy in Yemen are restricted in movement to a small portion of Sana'a where they don't actually meet the real/average Yemeni. It is understandable why Americans would be cautious, especially after the shameful attacks on the US Embassy in Libya and the resulting assassination of the Ambassador there. However, the primary role of embassies is to practice diplomacy and with so many restrictions, it is illogical to expect sincere communication between the two countries.

Prior to 1990, the US was primarily focused on its security. Its foreign policy included countering the former USSR (the South of Yemen, a separate country prior to 1990, was Marxist and an ally of USSR). After unification in 1990, the US focused on some development and educational/cultural exchange programs. There are two challenges facing US-Yemeni relations.

First, the development programs were concentrated on the Northern parts of Yemen while the majority of the drone strikes and AQAP activity is carried out in the South. The role of the US prior to the Arab Spring focused on supporting leaders in the Middle East who, in Yemen's case, weren't interested in the overall welfare of their people. To Southern separatists, former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, is an ally of the US but the main enemy. Currently, Southern separatist leaders are snubbed by the Yemeni government and the drone strikes carried out by the US in Southern regions of Yemen exacerbate the tensions.

It appears to some Yemenis that the US continues to support regimes rather than the people. To make matters worse, the US educational exchange programs haven't increased and their efforts are upstaged by several other countries who are providing better opportunities to Yemenis. Furthermore, it is near impossible for Yemenis to obtain visas for travel to the US. Every male over the age of 18 is treated like a suspect and until proven innocent, he will remain in Yemen.

To be a Yemeni in America: 

Some Yemenis live in communities, close to each other and maintain a traditional lifestyle, but others, like me, like to integrate into American society. Over the past seven years, I have come to love this country. Throughout several interactions, it became clear that many Americans don't know anything about Yemen but that the country harbors terrorists. I have been examined carefully because I look and behave in a similar manner. Some would say: "You don't look like a Yemeni!" but since they don't know much about the country, no Yemeni will look like one.

Yemeni-Americans have to challenge the "terrorist" stereotype on a daily basis. This stereotype is harsh and Yemenis in the US are burdened with the responsibility of representing all Yemenis, not just themselves. When disaster strikes in the US, Yemenis across the world, but more specifically in the US pray that the attacker is not Yemeni, nor has ties to Yemen. Yemenis in the US don't need that kind of attention. So we spend our lives telling Americans about our architecture, our coffee, our sky-rises and our queens. But all of that doesn't matter when an event like the Boston Marathon bombing takes place. Reporting on the incident, Chris Matthews proves that stereotypes persist:

"To be blunt and not be into political profiling or racial profiling but when you look at a picture that we’re looking at now are there people in the FBI in the investigative world that can look at the picture, study it ethnographically and figure what the odds are on a fellow like that being from different parts of the world say YEMEN…”

While Yemenis are offended and angry, it is not an option to be so. They have to restrain their anger and accept it for the sake of their heritage. As Americans they love America and don't want it to get hurt. Finally, Yemenis in America, like other Americans, are just as terrified of AQAP.

The Role of Yemen:

In the early 1990s, the Yemeni government promised to care for its people. Prior to that, and after only a few years of ruling in the North, former President Saleh had the key to remain in power for what seemed like a lifetime. Democracy and free elections continued to be a notion that Yemenis talk about but not really experience especially since none of the neighboring countries were democracies (mostly monarchies or dictatorships).

With globalization and the advancement of technology, many things in Yemen changed. Regardless, Saleh continued to rule. The Yemeni government took responsibility for the first drones used against AQAP; not to make the US look good, but rather because Saleh knew that he was betraying his own people. Some accuse Saleh's regime of fostering terrorist groups in order to fill his pockets. Others accuse him of feeding Americans false intelligence in order to attack his own rivals. While these accusations may or may not be true, the fact was that the government was no longer responsible for what goes on in its own land with its own people.

Today, President Abdurabbu Mansour Hadi is expected to meet the demands of the Yemeni people. While he needs to deal with the economic recession, poverty, famine, lack of security, etc. He is still expected to protest the excessive use of drones in Yemen (at least against signature strikes). In a separate conversation, a fellow Yemeni pointed out that president Hadi doesn't have a lot of leverage with the US because they are his main "backers", leaving his hands tied. Still, Scahill's statement resonates with me: "We need to hold our own government accountable"...

To be an American in Yemen:

My last trip to Yemen was in August of 2012 and anti-American sentiments were at an all time high. It was clear that the majority of Yemenis felt let down by their own government but even clearer that they were more so by the US. To them, liberal voices in the United States are silent on the killings carried out by drones on innocent lives. In turn, the liberals in Yemen, abandoned their American counterpart.

When Yemeni-Americans go back to Yemen, they become responsible for representing the values of America in Yemen. In his testimony on drones before congress, Farea' Al-Muslimi states:

"I went to the U.S. as an ambassador for Yemen. I came back to Yemen as an ambassador of the U.S."

When Yemeni-Americans are in Yemen, they feel the need to represent America well. They explain to Yemenis that what they see is a product of fear. Yemenis need to realize that these reactions do not reflect the sentiments of the American people. What Yemenis view as the US is nothing more than the implementation of a policy decided by branch within the US government: not even the entirety of the US government agree on it. However, these facts become harder to swallow as the heedless use of drones continues to increase.

The solution:

American Diplomats in Yemen are in a tough place. President Hadi is in a tough place. People in the US are scared of terrorism and Yemenis are scared of drones. 

No one can predict the end of this "war". The current tactics are futile; they are short term responses that postpone a real solution. To end these conflicts, we need to suspend militaristic realism, and we need to employ empathy and communication to foster amity in the long term. Finally, I have endless gratitude for Yemeni-Americans and Americans in Yemen who inspire peace rather than promote fear.

Hadi’s Gamble: Yemen’s Military Restructuring and its Impact on the Future

My latest Op-Ed for The National

On April 10, Yemen's President Abdrabu Mansur Hadi boldly issued a decree to restructure the nation's military. The most notable achievements of this decree was dismantling former president Ali Abdullah Saleh's grip on the military by sending many of his relatives abroad as diplomats.

The decision reinforced Mr Hadi's previous military decrees to abolish the First Armoured Division led by Gen Ali Mohsen Al Ahmar, and the Republican Guard, led by Mr Saleh's eldest son, Ahmed. These two units stirred the most controversy.

Still, the decree is a major gamble by Mr Hadi, who is looking to ease the tensions that have paralysed Yemen for the past two years. This move is aimed to define the function of the new military, but it will likely increase tensions in the long run rather than solve them.

The military structure is made up of three different powers: From the north, Gen Mohsen, who defected from the former regime, was named the chief military adviser to the president. As such, he will have major influence on the military. Together with the Islah party the main opposition party in Yemen, they control almost half of the military.

Mr Hadi, who hails from the south, controls the second large portion of the country's forces. The last component of the military belongs to the remnants of Mr Saleh's regime.

Based on these divisions, it is apparent that the military wasn't able to shake off former tribal influences, which leads to the conclusion that three main struggles are likely to arise due to geographical and ideological differences.

First, the northern powers of Gen Mohsen and Islah could threaten the Houthis, who control a largely autonomous area on the border with Saudi Arabia. Second, the southern powers of Mr Hadi could try to curb Hirak's separatist influence in the south. But th real struggle will manifest within the military, between the components as they strive for power and dominance.

In the past decade, the Yemeni government has fought an on­again, off­again guerrilla war against the Houthis, a Shia revivalist group. All of the six wars were spearheaded by Gen Mohsen under Saleh's regime. But, once Mr Saleh agreed to step down in late 2011, the conflict took on more of a sectarian character, as the Houthis increasingly clashed with tribal and religious militias linked Islah. These two strands of anti­Houthi resistance are now coming together.

Gen Mohsen may have lost his armoured division, but he remains a key military figure in the new order. More importantly, two of hi allies have been named regional commanders in the areas bordering the Houthis' stronghold in the north. As expected, the Houthi have marched against Mr Hadi's military reshuffling, believing that their enemies are looking to surround them and destroy them.

The threat to the Houthis is highly dangerous, particularly since the Houthis tend to lash out whenever they feel cornered. 

In the south, the rest of the military will be occupied with a different conflict. The leadership of Hirak, the southern movement pushin for secession, has refused to join the National Dialogue which is now underway. Almost all of the south's leadership, including Mr Hadi himself, belonged at some point to Yemen's Socialist Party.

Today, these leaders are divided between those who support the president, and in turn unity, and those who do not. Personal vendettas and long-standing feuds still colour much of the interaction in the south.

Two scenarios are possible: First, as is the case in the past, mysterious assassinations could begin between these opposing forces. Or, the conflict could morph into several regional conflicts.

Ultimately, the lives of separatists will be in danger. The military will always support the home region of the president, Abyan, and Islahis will not hesitate to involve their militias and their hold on the military to gain control over southern territories.

Yet the most important struggle will be the one within the military itself. The two dominating powers of the military, Gen Mohsen and Islah on the one hand and Mr Hadi's forces on the other, could easily result in a typical north-south regional schism. But it could also take on a more ideological flavour between those aligned with Islah and those who oppose the conservative religious party. Islah is looking to rule and Mr Hadi, at some point, will have to seriously consider joining forces with them.

That leaves Mr Saleh's allies, the vulnerable component of the military, to seek new alliances outside of the military. It is likely that they will collaborate with the Houthis and Hirak.

The new military decree suggests that Mr Hadi is unlikely to step down in 2014, or even 2016 for that matter. Through the military, Mr Hadi is finally establishing his authority and if he leaves in the near future, the balance of power in Yemen will be skewed. Yemenis will continue to battle over political, ideological and regional influence.

The military restructuring doesn't solve Yemen's infighting. Rather, it could exacerbate it at a time when the country has more pressing issues. Within this military reshuffle are the seeds of years of future conflicts.

Military Restructuring in Yemen: Exploring Transformation

President Hadi's decree no. 16 for 2013 on military restructuring has been dubbed "historical" and "unprecedented". It was welcomed by most media outlets. On Yemen's ground, the news received mixed reviews: those who protest Saleh's immunity are upset that these appointments "reward criminals", while those who are skeptical of the transitional period are relieved to see many of Saleh's men transferred outside of the country. It is a chance for stability. Like Yemenis say, Le Kol Hadethen Hadeeth, For each occasion its own conversation.  So, in today's post, Yemeniaty examines the focal points of the new appointments and whether it is really historical. 

The New Military 

The previous chart reveals the new power distribution based on governorates/region. The regions colored in white didn't gain any influence. Conversations on military restructuring can prove confusing; however, one must remember these key points: 

1) Mohsen's First Armor Division and Saleh's Republican Guard are dissolved. 
2) Regional Military Commanders are independent from local military units. 
3) The Military reserve now follows the Ministry of Defense and no longer the President. 
4) Military divisons are now based on tasks and each have designated weapons (Yes, it was a mess!).
5) The Military will be composed of seven commands based on geographical divisions. However these commands will be labeled numerically rather than regionally. (Note Hadi's Southern Mentality: after independence from British Colonialism, Southerners referred to governorates by numbers rather than by their traditional names).

The seven regional divisions are as follows: Regional Division 1 (Sayoun), Regional Division 2 (Al-Mukalla), Regional Division 3 (Marib), Regional Division 4 (Aden), Regional Division 5 (Al- Hodaydah), Regional Division 6 ('Amran), and finally Regional Division 7 (Dhamar). 

The New Power Struggle 

The main distribution of military power reveals three key players. First, it is important to note that Saleh's power is not entirely gone as he did rule the country for 33 years.Thus, one of the key players is (what is left of) his regime. Out of the new seven military commands, Saleh's allies still have two.

The two other key players are relatively new: in the North there is Ali Mohsen and Al-Islah and in the South there is Hadi. 

In the North, Ali Mohsen came out on top while Al-Ahmar's family, still belonging to Islah, did not really get what they want. Colonel Hashem Al-Ahmar was sent away as part of Saleh's men to Saudi Arabia to hold the position of Defense Attaché. Carefully, Islah is strengthening its relationship with Ali Mohsen. Under Mohsen's direct influence are Major General Al-Sawmali, First Regional Military Commander (Region Sayoun), Major General Al-Maqdashi, Sixth Regional Military Commander (Region 'Amran), and Brigadier General Shamiri, Commander of the 27th Mechanized Brigade. Islah's most influence is on Brigadier General Muthana, Seventh Regional Military Commander (Region Dhamar). The combined Northern powers control almost half of the seven military commands. 

As for the South, Hadi distributed a generous amount of positions for people who were once members of the former YSP. Recalling Al-Toghmah and Al-Zomrah YSP divisons, one might be pleasantly surprised to know that Hadi, a Zomrah himself, appointed 13 Al-Toghmah members. Some might, wrongfully, consider it a peace offering to the Southern Hirak. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Those specific Toghmah individuals abandoned their former allies and are now loyal to Hadi. Furthermore, all of the Toghmah individuals were secondary commanders to begin with. 

Not to mention that Hadi is using a familiar tactic. Saleh previously appointed people from his town/village in important positions and now Hadi is following suit. Take Major General Mhanaf, the new Chief of the Intelligence Bureau; he replaced the Southern Al-Yafi'i, mainly because Mhanaf is from the same part of Abbyan as Hadi. Not to mention that the New Minister of Defense, Brigadier General Hujairi, and the Assistant Secretary of Denfense for Human Resources, Major General Ben Fareed, are all Hadi's men. Assertively, Hadi positioned his authority as the new kid on the block. The new military is in the hands of Mohsen and Islah in the North and Hadi in the South. 

Farewell Saleh? 

Every time we begin to forget former President Saleh's name, a news article here or there reminds us of his presence. Whether is it news over his health, an opening of a "Saleh museum", or delivering a speech about freedom, he somehow reappears. Saleh would have been forgotten a lot quicker if it wasn't for his carefully formulated central authority. He spent years positioning those who are near and dear to him in powerful positions.  Just when Yemenis were giving up hope, President Hadi decided to play scramble with his men. Hadi, diplomatically, gave them ambassadorial and consular positions. 

In a twist of fate, this move, applied on Saleh's allies, was utilized by Saleh himself. For years, he sent individuals inconvenient to his authority into the foreign service program. For instance he sent  the three following men to Washington DC as Ambassadors: Yehya Al-Mutawakkil, Mohammed Al-Eryani and Mohsen Al-'Aini. Now, it is Hadi's time. 

Hadi began with Ahmed Ali Saleh, previously expected to inherit Yemen's presidency. Saleh the son will settle for the position of Ambassador in the United Arab Emirates. There, he can join other members of his family who settled in Abu Dhabi over the past two years. He is guaranteed to live in luxury and to relax for the rest of his diplomatic career.  As for the rest of Saleh's family and allies, they were appointed as Defense Attachés to the following countries: Qatar, Egypt, Germany, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia. 

The Rise of Ali Mohsen

Major General Ali Mohsen is from the same city as Saleh, Sanhan. Ali Mohsen served as Saleh's right hand man for decades as the president's Chief Military Advisor. Some called him "the second most powerful man in Yemen" and others who knew him more closely called him "the most powerful man in Yemen". In December of 2012, some thought that Mohsen's glory was coming to an end since his First Armoured Division was terminated. However, in April 2013, and according to Hadi's decree, Mohsen is once more a presidential Military Advisor. 

The rise of Ali Mohsen was expected, and in fact slower than anticipated. Ali Mohsen's defection in March of 2011 from Saleh was the catalyst that encouraged 
those who were loyal to the former president to oppose him publicly. Mohsen abandoned his life long friend after rumored disagreements on Ahmed Ali Saleh's (Saleh's oldest son) growing influence in Yemen. In this power struggle, Mohsen came out on top. Shortly after Mohsen declaration of "supporting and protecting the revolutionaries" Islah welcomed Mohsen as a freedom fighter, forgiving all his past sins. On the other hand, independent revolutionaries considered his role in the revolution as a clear indication that Yemen's revolution was hijacked and doomed. Realistically, it would be near impossible to dispose of Mohsen. His influence couldn't be shaken and now he is part of the new system. So today, we have the "March 21st Garden" in Mathbah (Sana'a) as a park for Yemenis in place of Mohsen's former First Armor Division.